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Título: Una comparación longitudinal de los modelos de los trastornos de 
ansiedad de la terapia metacognitiva y la terapia de aceptación y compro-
miso. 
Resumen: La terapia metacognitiva (MCT) sugiere que los trastornos de 
ansiedad son causados por el síndrome atencional cognitivo (CAS), que es 
apoyado por creencias metacognitivas disfuncionales. La terapia de acepta-
ción y compromiso (ACT) enfatiza el rol de la fusión cognitiva y la evita-
ción experiencial en el desarrollo de estos trastornos. En este estudio se hi-
potetizó que los conceptos de fusión cognitiva y evitación experiencial 
mediarían la relación entre las creencias metacognitivas disfuncionales y los 
síntomas de ansiedad/estrés. Se utilizó un diseño longitudinal. Ciento seis 
participantes respondieron en dos ocasiones a una encuesta online en el la-
pos de nueve meses. La fusión cognitiva en el Tiempo 2 medió el efecto de 
las creencias metacognitivas en el Tiempo 1 en los síntomas de ansiedad en 
el Tiempo 2, mientras que la fusión cognitiva y la evitación experiencial 
mediaron el efecto en los síntomas de estrés. La fusión cognitiva medió el 
efecto de las creencias metacognitivas positivas sólo en los síntomas de es-
trés. Los resultados justifican comparaciones adicionales de los modelos de 
MCT y ACT.  
Palabras clave: evitación experiencial; fusión cognitiva; creencias meta-
cognitivas; ansiedad; estrés. 
  Abstract: Metacognitive therapy (MCT) suggests that anxiety disorders are 
caused by the cognitive attentional syndrome (CAS), which is supported 
by dysfunctional metacognitive beliefs. Acceptance and commitment ther-
apy (ACT) emphasizes the role of cognitive fusion and experiential avoid-
ance in the development of these disorders. In this study, it was hypothe-
sized that the ACT concepts of cognitive fusion and experiential avoid-
ance would mediate the relationship between dysfunctional metacognitive 
beliefs and anxiety/stress symptoms. A longitudinal design was employed. 
One hundred and six nonclinical participants responded twice to an online 
survey with a lapse of nine months. Cognitive fusion at Time 2 mediated 
the effect of negative metacognitive beliefs at Time 1 on anxiety symp-
toms at T2, whereas both cognitive fusion and experiential avoidance me-
diated the effect on stress symptoms. Cognitive fusion mediated the effect 
of positive metacognitive beliefs only on stress symptoms. These results 
warrant further comparison of the MCT and ACT models.   





The Self-Regulatory Executive Function model (S-REF; 
Wells, 2000; Wells & Matthews, 1994) suggests that the cause 
of anxiety disorders is the activation of a specific pattern of 
thinking called the cognitive attentional syndrome (CAS), 
which consists of repetitive thinking in the form of worry 
and rumination, excessive attentional focus on thoughts and 
feelings including threat monitoring, and counterproductive 
coping behaviors such as avoidance and thought suppres-
sion. The CAS is thought to be problematic because it ex-
tends negative thinking, leads to reduced attentional flexibil-
ity and failure to exercise appropriate control over negative 
experiences (Wells, 2009).  
According to the S-REF model, the CAS is generated by 
two broadly defined types of metacognitive beliefs: (a) posi-
tive beliefs concerning the benefits of worrying, ruminating, 
threat monitoring, and maladaptive coping strategies; and (b) 
negative beliefs about the uncontrollability of worry and ru-
mination, and the importance and dangerous consequences 
of anxiety experiences. On the one hand, positive beliefs 
support the use of the CAS as coping strategies in response 
to anxiety and stress, which in turn, due to the nature of the 
CAS, ironically causes more emotional disturbance. On the 
other hand, negative beliefs contribute to the persistence of 
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worry and rumination because the individual lacks metacog-
nitive awareness that these processes are subject to voluntary 
control. Accordingly, individuals get entangled in worry and 
ruminative cycles that they are unable to stop and fail to real-
ize that the CAS is the problem and not the solution to their 
situation. The CAS is also provoked and further promotes 
the dominance of the object mode of processing, which en-
tails experiencing thoughts as reflecting reality and with no 
separation between the self and the act of thinking. Con-
versely, a more adaptive mode of processing is the metacog-
nitive mode that involves experiencing thoughts as simply 
passing events in the mind.   
In conclusion, the S-REF model proposes that positive 
and negative metacognitive beliefs lead to the use of CAS, 
which is the most proximal cause of the development and 
maintenance of anxiety disorders. In other words, the effect 
of dysfunctional metacognitive beliefs on anxiety is mediated 
by engagement in CAS.  
Another relatively recent approach to anxiety disorders is 
acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, 
& Wilson, 1999). The ACT model emphasizes the pernicious 
role of cognitive fusion and experiential avoidance in the de-
velopment and maintenance of anxiety disorders. Cognitive 
fusion refers to a verbal process by which individuals be-
come attached to private experiences (e.g., thoughts, memo-
ries, sensations, etc.) and fail to discriminate that they are on-
ly ongoing experiences that do not necessarily have to guide 
behavior. Therefore, when individuals are fused with their 
private experiences, they act according to their literal con-
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tent, which usually leads to engaging in experiential avoid-
ance strategies (e.g., suppression, distraction, worry, rumina-
tion, etc.). Experiential avoidance is a pattern of verbal regu-
lation based on deliberate efforts to either avoid or escape 
from discomfiting private experiences even when doing so 
leads to actions that are inconsistent with one’s values and 
goals (Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl, 1996). 
When rigidly applied, experiential avoidance has a paradoxi-
cal effect because, although it often works in the short term 
by reducing discomfort and increasing the feeling that one is 
doing what one is supposed to do, it usually expands un-
wanted private experiences in the long term and further pre-
vents the person from moving toward valued directions. 
As the MCT and ACT models come from different phil-
osophical and theoretical standpoints, they have not been 
compared in detail in the literature. However, we suggest 
that MCT and ACT models share an important number of 
similarities. For instance, from the MCT perspective, the 
ACT processes of experiential avoidance and cognitive fu-
sion can be seen as parts of the CAS. Indeed, worry and ru-
mination have been proposed to be experiential avoidance 
strategies (Borkovec, 1994; Giorgio et al., 2010; Roemer & 
Orsillo, 2002). Likewise, the object mode of processing and 
paying excessive attentional focus to thoughts and feelings 
resembles cognitive fusion. Also, like the CAS, experiential 
avoidance is thought to have counterproductive effects that 
lead to more emotional disturbance. From an ACT perspec-
tive, dysfunctional metacognitive beliefs can be interpreted 
as verbal rules that prompt cognitive fusion with anxious 
thoughts and feelings and the use of experiential avoidance 
strategies such as worry, rumination, thought suppression, 
etc. to deal with them.  
One important difference between both models is that 
while in the S-REF model, metacognitive beliefs are seen as 
the cause of the CAS, in the ACT model, metacognitive be-
liefs can be seen as derivatives of engaging in cognitive fu-
sion and experiential avoidance. In this sense, both cognitive 
fusion and experiential avoidance are relatively simple verbal 
processes, and individuals do not need to present dysfunc-
tional metacognitive beliefs in order to engage in them. Con-
versely, as individuals engage in experiential avoidance, posi-
tive metacognitive beliefs will likely emerge as they can expe-
rience their often short-term positive consequences (i.e., re-
ducing unpleasant private experiences). Likewise, negative 
metacognitive beliefs will likely appear as individuals further 
engage in cognitive fusion and experiential avoidance be-
cause they can begin to experience that anxiety is more pre-
sent and causes negative consequences in their lives and that 
their own worry, rumination, and threat monitoring are un-
controllable (i.e., negative metacognitive beliefs), as they 
have become predominant behavioral repertoires. Once 
these positive and negative metacognitive beliefs are generat-
ed, they further promote cognitive fusion and experiential 
avoidance, which only aggravate the situation. 
The current study was designed to preliminarily compare 
the MCT and ACT models of anxiety disorders. One hun-
dred and six nonclinical participants responded twice to an 
online survey containing questionnaires assessing the con-
structs of interest with a lapse of nine months. Firstly, ac-
cording to our interpretation of the CAS as involving cogni-
tive fusion and experiential avoidance, and according to the 
S-REF model, we hypothesized that both ACT constructs 
would longitudinally mediate the effect of dysfunctional 
metacognitive beliefs in the development of anxiety and 
stress symptoms. Secondly, according to the ACT model, we 
hypothesized that experiential avoidance and cognitive fu-
sion as measured at Time 1 (T1) would significantly predict 
dysfunctional metacognitive beliefs at Time 2 (T2) even 
when controlling for metacognitive beliefs and anxiety/stress 
symptoms at T1. Conversely, we did not expect that dys-
functional metacognitive beliefs at T1 would be significant 
predictors of experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion at 






The sample consisted of 289 participants (59.5% females) 
with age ranging between 22 and 82 years (M = 35.38, SD = 
8.63). The relative educational level of the participants was: 
7.3% primary studies, 32.8% mid-level study graduates, and 
59.9% were college graduates. They responded to an anony-
mous internet survey distributed through social media. All of 
them were Spanish speakers. Thirty-six percent reported 
having received psychological or psychiatric treatment at 
some time, but only 6.6% were currently in treatment. Also, 
4.8% of participants reported consumption of some psycho-




Acceptance and Action Questionnaire – II (AAQ-II; Bond et 
al., 2011; Spanish version by Ruiz, Langer, Luciano, Cangas, 
& Beltrán, 2013; Ruiz et al., 2016). The AAQ-II is a general 
measure of experiential avoidance or psychological inflexibil-
ity. It consists of 7 items that are rated on a 7-point Likert-
type scale (1 = never true; 7 = always true). The items reflect 
unwillingness to experience unwanted emotions and 
thoughts and the inability to be in the present moment and 
behave according to value-directed actions when experienc-
ing psychological events that could undermine them. The 
AAQ-II has shown a one-factor solution and good psycho-
metric properties.  
Believability of Anxious Feelings and Thoughts Questionnaire 
(BAFT; Herzberg et al., 2012; Spanish version by Ruiz, 
Odriozola-González, & Suárez-Falcón, 2014).  The BAFT is 
a self-report measure of cognitive fusion with anxious 
thoughts and feelings. It consists of 16 items representing 
different thoughts which are rated on a 7-point Likert-type 
scale ranging from 1 (not at all believable) to 7 (completely believa-
ble) to the extent that the individual believes in them. The 
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Spanish version of the BAFT showed a hierarchical factor 
structure with two lower order factors that were labeled 
Negative Evaluation (12 items) and Emotion Regulation (4 
items) and a second-order factor. The emotion regulation 
factor showed significantly lower correlations with experien-
tial avoidance and anxiety-related measures, and the use of 
the 12 items of the negative evaluation factor was suggested 
as a reduced version of the BAFT. Accordingly, this reduced 
version of the BAFT was used in this study. The BAFT has 
excellent internal consistency and good psychometric prop-
erties.  
Metacognitions Questionnaire-30 (MCQ-30; Wells & Cart-
wright-Hatton, 2004). The MCQ-30 is a short version of the 
MCQ-65. It is a 30-item, 4-point Likert-type scale (1 = do not 
agree; 4 = agree very much) that contains the following five fac-
tors: Positive Beliefs about Worry, Negative Beliefs about 
Uncontrollability and Danger of Worry, Beliefs about the 
Need to Control Thoughts, Cognitive Confidence, and Cog-
nitive Self-Consciousness. Only the first three factors were 
administered in this study. The MCQ-30 has shown good in-
ternal consistency, convergent validity, and acceptable test-
retest reliability. We used the Spanish version employed by 
Odriozola-González (2011), which showed good internal 
consistency in the subscales administered in the current 
study (alphas from .78 to .84). 
Depression Anxiety and Stress Scales-21 (DASS-21; Antony, 
Bieling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 1998; Spanish version by 
Daza, Novy, Stanley, & Averill, 2002). The DASS-21 is a 21-
item, 4-point Likert-type scale (0 = did not apply to me at all; 3 
= applied to me very much, or most of the time) consisting of sen-
tences describing negative emotional states. It contains three 
subscales (Depression, Anxiety, and Stress), each one with 
seven items, and has shown good internal consistency and 
convergent and discriminant validity. Only the results of the 
Anxiety and Stress subscales will be presented here because 




At Time 1 (T1), an anonymous survey was distributed 
through social media with the title “Survey of Psychological 
Discomfort Applied to Online General Population.” The 
first page of the survey stated that the data obtained would 
only be used for scientific purposes and specified the re-
quirements to participate: (a) to be older than 18 years old, 
and (b) to be a Spanish speaker. When participants provided 
informed consent, the previous questionnaires appeared in 
the order presented above. Nine months after the first sur-
vey application (T2), participants were invited to respond to 
the follow-up survey, which contained the same question-
naires, and was completed by 106 participants. Participants’ 
responses at T1 and T2 were matched according to socio-





All statistical analyses were run in SPSS 22©. Descriptive 
data, Cronbach’s alphas, and zero-order relationships be-
tween all constructs were computed first. Because scores on 
the constructs of interest did not show a normal distribution, 
Mann Whitney’s U was computed to analyze potential differ-
ences between participants who completed the study and 
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Subsequently, several regression analyses were conduct-
ed. To explore potential multicollinearity problems, the vari-
ance inflation factor (VIF) for each regression analysis was 
computed first. Following Ato and Vallejo (2007), VIF val-
ues above 10 were considered as indicative of problematic 
multicollinearity. None multicollinearity problem was found. 
Six independent, parallel, multiple mediation analyses (Ato & 
Vallejo, 2011) were conducted with the non-parametric 
bootstrapping procedure to estimate direct and indirect ef-
fects using the PROCESS package (Hayes, 2013). In all me-
diation analyses, scores on one type of metacognitive beliefs 
(positive, negative, or need to control thoughts beliefs) (X) as 
measured at T1 served as predictor variable. Experiential 
avoidance (M1) and cognitive fusion (M2) scores as measured 
at T2 were entered as putative mediators. Although the 
AAQ-II and BAFT were administered at both waves, scores 
on T2 were selected because they were the most accurate as-
sessment of what occurred between T1 and T2. Specific 
emotional symptomatology at T2 served as criterion varia-
bles (Y): anxiety or stress. Lastly, to control for T1 symptom 
level, scores in the same type of symptom entered as Y were 
included as covariates. As shown in Figure 1, the effect of 
metacognitive beliefs (X) on anxiety and stress symptoms (Y) 
is modeled through three pathways: one direct and two indi-
rect pathways. The direct effect (c’) runs from metacognitive 
beliefs to anxiety or stress symptoms without passing 
through either experiential avoidance or cognitive fusion. 
The first indirect pathway runs from metacognitive beliefs to 
anxiety or stress symptoms through experiential avoidance 
(a1b1). The second indirect pathway (IE2) runs from meta-
cognitive beliefs to symptoms through cognitive fusion 
(a2b2). The effect sizes of mediation were computed using the 
completely standardized indirect effect (abcs; Preacher & Kel-
ley, 2011). This effect size measure relies on the product of 
betas for paths a and b, and can be interpreted as the ex-
pected change in the dependent variable (i.e., emotional 
symptoms) per unit change in the predicting variables (i.e., 
metacognitive beliefs) that occurs indirectly through the me-
diators (i.e., experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion). 
Following Kenny’s (2014) suggestion, small, medium, and 
large effect sizes would be, respectively, .01, .09, and .25.  
Lastly, to examine the predictors at T1 of dysfunctional 
metacognitive beliefs at T2, three hierarchical regression 
analyses were conducted. Step 1 entered all three metacogni-
tive beliefs. Step 2 entered anxiety and stress symptoms. 
Lastly, experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion were in-
troduced in Step 3. To explore the predictors at T1 of expe-
riential avoidance and cognitive fusion at T2, two additional 
hierarchical regression analyses were conducted. Step 1 en-
tered experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion; Step 2 en-
tered anxiety and stress symptoms; and Step 3 entered all 




Descriptive Data, Internal Consistencies and Zero-
Order Correlations 
 
Table 1 shows the descriptive data, internal consistencies 
obtained for each scale, and the correlations between 
measures at T1 and T2 for the 106 participants who com-
pleted the study. The internal consistencies of the AAQ-II, 
BAFT, and the Anxiety and Stress subscales of the DASS-21 
were good. With respect to the factors of the MCQ-30, in-
ternal consistencies were acceptable, ranging from .73 to .87. 
In all cases, Cronbach’s alphas were similar to previous evi-
dence using all these instruments. Participants who complet-
ed the study did not show statistically significant differences 
from the participants who did not respond to the question-
naires at T2 in any measure. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Data, Internal Consistencies, and Correlations at T1 and T2. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 M SD α 
1. Anxiety (T1)              2.53 2.94 .83 
2. Stress (T1) .66**             5.60 3.69 .82 
3. Experiential avoidance (T1) .41** .48**            19.56 7.54 .89 
4. Cognitive fusion (T1) .59** .64** .72**           29.60 14.07 .91 
5. Positive meta-beliefs (T1) .21* .12 .19 .18          9.20 3.25 .87 
6. Negative meta-beliefs (T1) .33** .45** .60** .57** .26**         12.19 3.17 .76 
7. Beliefs need to control (T1) .30** .35** .46** .58** .22* .48**        11.17 3.26 .75 
8. Anxiety (T2) .53** .37** .39** .45** .09 .30** .24*       2.16 2.67 .84 
9. Stress (T2) .35** .44** .43** .39** .11 .37** .20* .71**      4.84 3.68 .87 
10. Experiential avoidance (T2) .27** .34** .79** .60** .20* .43** .36** .36** .49**     18.00 7.31 .89 
11. Cognitive fusion (T2) .45** .39** .58** .63** .26** .42** .42** .56** .55** .61**    27.24 13.85 .92 
12. Positive meta-beliefs (T2) .11 .04 .20* .12 .66** .21* .21* .09 .17 .25* .38**   8.90 2.99 .87 
13. Negative meta-beliefs (T2) .30** .44** .62** .60** .17 .68** .46** .33** .49** .63** .53** .29**  11.47 3.26 .76 
14. Beliefs need to control (T2) .29** .45** .60** .65** .25** .60** .66** .28** .27** .55** .52** .37** .64** 10.20 3.15 .75 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
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Mediation Analyses of the Effect of Positive Meta-
cognitive Beliefs on Anxiety and Stress 
 
Table 2 presents the set of regression analyses conducted 
to explore the mediating role of experiential avoidance and 
cognitive fusion in the relationship between positive meta-
cognitive beliefs and anxiety (upper part of the table) and 
stress symptoms (lower part). In the first two models, when 
controlling for anxiety levels at T1, positive metacognitive 
beliefs (X) at T1 did not significantly predict experiential 
avoidance at T2 (M1) (TE = .322, SE = .216, p =. 139) and 
marginally predicted cognitive fusion at T2 (M2) (TE = .737, 
SE = .377, p = .053). Only anxiety symptoms at T1 (TE = 
.322, SE = .078, p < .001) and cognitive fusion at T2 (TE = 
.078, SE = .020, p < .001) were significant predictors of anx-
iety symptoms at T2. The model accounted for 41.7% of the 
variance. The total indirect effect of positive metacognitive 
beliefs on anxiety through experiential avoidance and cogni-
tive fusion was not significant (TE = .061, 95% BC CI [-
.006, .139]; although it was significant at 90% BC CI [.007, 
129]), with a small effect size (abcs = .086).    
With regard to stress symptoms, positive metacognitive 
beliefs at T1 marginally predicted experiential avoidance (M1) 
(TE = .354, SE = .207, p =. 089) and significantly predicted 
cognitive fusion at T2 (M2) (TE = .937, SE = .378, p = .015). 
Stress symptoms at T1 (TE = .243, SE = .085, p = .005), 
cognitive fusion (TE = .090, SE = .027, p = .001) and expe-
riential avoidance at T2 (TE = .104, SE = .050, p = .040) 
significantly predicted stress symptoms at T2. The model ac-
counted for 39% of the variance. The total indirect effect of 
positive metacognitive beliefs at T1 on stress symptoms at 
T2 was statistically significant (TE = .121, 95% BC CI [.040, 
.252]) and with a medium effect size (abcs = .118). The specif-
ic indirect effects through experiential avoidance (TE = .037, 
95% BC CI [.001, .114], abcs = .036) and cognitive fusion (TE 
= .084, 95% BC CI [.024, .212], abcs = .082) were also signifi-
cant.  
 
Table 2. Results from the Regression Analyses Examining the Parallel Multiple Mediator Model of the Effect of Positive Metacognitive Beliefs (X) on Anx-
iety (First Part of the Table) and Stress (Second Part of the Table) (Y) through Experiential Avoidance (M1) and Cognitive Fusion (M2). 
    Bootstrapping BC 95% CI 
 Coefficient SE p Lower Upper 
MODEL M1 (AAQ-II) (T2)   
X (Positive beliefs) (T1) .322 .216 .139   
Anxiety (T1) .599 .239 .014   
Constant 13.522 2.066 < .001   
R2 = .093   
F(2, 103) = 5.291, p = .006   
MODEL M2 (BAFT) (T2)   
X (Positive beliefs) (T1) .737 .377 .053   
Anxiety (T1) 1.956 .416 < .001   
Constant 15.507 3.599 < .001   
R2 = .233   
F(2, 103) = 15.642, p < .001   
MODEL Y (Anxiety) (T2)   
X (Positive beliefs) (T1) -.081 .065 .215   
Anxiety (T1) .322 .078 < .001   
M1 (AAQ-II) (T2) .011 .035 .753   
M2 (BAFT) (T2) .078 .020 < .001   
Constant -.242 .727 .740   
R2 = .417   
F(4, 101) = 18.081, p < .001   
INDIRECT EFFECTS   
Overall indirect effect .061 .036  -.006 .139 
Indirect effect 1: AAQ-II   .004 .014  -.013 .047 
Indirect effect 2: BAFT  .058 .035  -.004 .136 
MODEL M1 (AAQ-II) (T2)   
X (Positive beliefs) (T1) .354 .207 .089   
Stress (T1) .645 .182 .001   
Constant 11.126 2.157 < .001   
R2 = .142   
F(2, 103) = 8.550, p < .001   
MODEL M2 (BAFT) (T2)   
X (Positive beliefs) (T1) .937 .378 .015   
Stress (T1) 1.382 .333 < .001   
Constant 10.876 3.940 .007   
R2 = .202   
F(2, 103) = 13.054, p < .001   
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    Bootstrapping BC 95% CI 
 Coefficient SE p Lower Upper 
MODEL Y (Stress) (T2)   
X (Positive beliefs) (T1) -.049 .091 .592   
Stress (T1) .243 .085 .005   
M1 (AAQ-II) (T2) .104 .050 .040   
M2 (BAFT) (T2) .090 .027 .001   
Constant -.385 1.036 .711   
R2 = .390   
F(4, 101) = 16.123, p < .001   
INDIRECT EFFECTS   
Overall indirect effect .121 .051  .040 .252 
Indirect effect 1: AAQ-II .037 .026  .001 .114 
Indirect effect 2: BAFT .084 .041  .024 .212 
Note. AAQ = Acceptance and Action Questionnaire – II, BAFT = Believability of Anxious Thoughts and Feelings. 
 
Mediation Analyses of the Effect of Negative Meta-
cognitive Beliefs on Anxiety and Stress  
 
Table 3 presents the set of regression analyses conducted 
to explore the mediating role of experiential avoidance and 
cognitive fusion in the relationship between negative meta-
cognitive beliefs and anxiety (upper part of the table) and 
stress (lower part) symptoms. When controlling for anxiety 
levels at T1, negative metacognitive beliefs (X) at T1 signifi-
cantly predicted experiential avoidance (M1) (TE = .877, SE 
= .215, p < .001) and cognitive fusion at T2 (M2) (TE = 
1.336, SE = .384, p = .001). Only anxiety symptoms at T1 
(TE = .309, SE = .079, p < .001) and cognitive fusion at T2 
(TE = .075, SE = .020, p < .001) were significant predictors 
of anxiety symptoms at T2. The model accounted for 40.8% 
of the variance. The total indirect effect of negative meta-
cognitive beliefs on anxiety through experiential avoidance 
and cognitive fusion was significant (TE = .106, 95% BC CI 
[.028, .209], abcs = .140), with only the indirect effect through 
cognitive fusion being statistically significant (TE = .100, 
95% BC CI [.033, .216], abcs = .132).   
With respect to stress symptoms, negative metacognitive 
beliefs (X) at T1 significantly predicted experiential avoid-
ance (M1) (TE = .792, SE = .225, p = .001) and cognitive fu-
sion at T2 (M2) (TE = 1.340, SE = .422, p = .002). Only 
stress symptoms at T1 (TE = .230, SE = .090, p = .012) and 
cognitive fusion at T2 (TE = .085, SE = .027, p = .002) were 
significant predictors of stress symptoms at T2. Experiential 
avoidance at T2 marginally predicted stress symptoms at T2 
(TE = .098, SE = .051, p = .058). The model accounted for 
38.9% of the variance. The total indirect effect of negative 
metacognitive beliefs on stress through experiential avoid-
ance and cognitive fusion was significant (TE = .192, 95% 
BC CI [.065, .323], abcs = .165), with both specific indirect ef-
fects through experiential avoidance (TE = .077, 95% BC CI 
[.006, .203], abcs = .067) and cognitive fusion (TE = .114, 
95% BC CI [.029, .244], abcs = .098) being statistically signifi-
cant.   
 
Table 3. Results from the Regression Analyses Examining the Parallel Multiple Mediator Model of the Effect of Negative Metacognitive Beliefs (X) on 
Anxiety (First Part of the Table) and Stress (Second Part of the Table) (Y) through Experiential Avoidance (M1) and Cognitive Fusion (M2). 
    Bootstrapping BC 95% CI 
 Coefficient SE p Lower Upper 
MODEL M1 (AAQ-II) (T2)   
X (Negative beliefs) (T1) .877 .215 < .001   
Anxiety (T1) .363 .232 .120   
Constant 6.394 2.566 .014   
R2 = .203   
F(2, 103) = 13.102, p < .001   
MODEL M2 (BAFT) (T2)   
X (Negative beliefs) (T1) 1.336 .384 .001   
Anxiety (T1) 1.656 .415 < .001   
Constant 6.770 4.594 .144   
R2 = .288   
F(2, 103) = 20.828, p < .001   
MODEL Y (Anxiety) (T2)   
X (Negative beliefs) (T1) .015 .074 .843   
Anxiety (T1) .309 .079 < .001   
M1 (AAQ-II) (T2) .007 .036 .842   
M2 (BAFT) (T2) .075 .020 < .001   
Constant -.959 .838 .255   
R2 = .408   
F(4, 101) = 17.438, p < .001   
A longitudinal comparison of metacognitive therapy and acceptance and commitment therapy models of anxiety disorders                                                  13 
 
anales de psicología, 2017, vol. 33, nº 1 (january) 
    Bootstrapping BC 95% CI 
 Coefficient SE p Lower Upper 
INDIRECT EFFECTS   
Overall indirect effect .106 .046  .028 .209 
Indirect effect 1: AAQ-II .006 .031  -.051 .078 
Indirect effect 2: BAFT .100 .045  .033 .216 
MODEL M1 (AAQ-II) (T2)   
X (Negative beliefs) (T1) .792 .225 .001   
Stress (T1) .375 .194 .056   
Constant 6.246 2.540 .016   
R2 = .212   
F(2, 103) = 13.881, p < .001   
MODEL M2 (BAFT) (T2)   
X (Negative beliefs) (T1) 1.340 .422 .002   
Stress (T1) .959 .364 .010   
Constant 5.529 4.758 .248   
R2 = .230   
F(2, 103) = 15.374, p < .001   
MODEL Y (Stress) (T2)   
X (Negative beliefs) (T1) .049 .108 .650   
Stress (T1) .230 .090 .012   
M1 (AAQ-II) (T2) .098 .051 .058   
M2 (BAFT) (T2) .085 .027 .002   
Constant -1.132 1.168 .335   
R2 = .389   
F(4, 101) = 16.090, p < .001   
INDIRECT EFFECTS   
Overall indirect effect .192 .067  .065 .323 
Indirect effect 1: AAQ-II .077 .048  .006 .203 
Indirect effect 2: BAFT .114 .053  .029 .244 
Note. AAQ = Acceptance and Action Questionnaire – II, BAFT = Believability of Anxious Thoughts and Feelings. 
 
Mediation Analyses of the Effect of Beliefs about the 
Need to Control on Anxiety and Stress 
 
Table 4 shows that when controlling for anxiety levels at 
T1, beliefs about the need to control (X) at T1 significantly 
predicted experiential avoidance (M1) (TE = .689, SE = .212, 
p = .002) and cognitive fusion at T2 (M2) (TE = 1.345, SE = 
.368, p < .001). Only anxiety symptoms at T1 (TE = .317, 
SE = .078, p < .001) and cognitive fusion at T2 (TE = .077, 
SE = .021, p < .001) were significant predictors of anxiety 
symptoms at T2. The model accounted for 41% of the vari-
ance. The total indirect effect of beliefs about the need to 
control on anxiety through experiential avoidance and cogni-
tive fusion was significant (TE = .112, 95% BC CI [.034, 
.247], abcs = .153), with only the indirect effect through cog-
nitive fusion being statistically significant (TE = .104, 95% 
BC CI [.028, .222], abcs = .142).   
Regarding stress symptoms, beliefs about the need to 
control (X) at T1 significantly predicted experiential avoid-
ance (M1) (TE = .617, SE = .213, p = .005) and cognitive fu-
sion at T2 (M2) (TE = 1.386, SE = .387, p = .001). Stress 
symptoms at T1 (TE = .268, SE = .086, p = .002), cognitive 
fusion (TE = .096, SE = .027, p = .001) and experiential 
avoidance (TE = .111, SE = .050, p = .028) at T2 were sig-
nificant predictors of stress symptoms at T2. The model ac-
counted for 40% of the variance. The total indirect effect of 
beliefs about the need to control on stress through experien-
tial avoidance and cognitive fusion was significant (TE = 
.202, 95% BC CI [.072, .380], abcs = .187), with both specific 
indirect effects through experiential avoidance (TE = .068, 
95% BC CI [.006, .198], abcs = .063) and cognitive fusion (TE 
= .133, 95% BC CI [.048, .266], abcs = .124) being statistically 
significant. 
 
Prediction of Dysfunctional Metacognitive Beliefs, 
Experiential Avoidance, and Cognitive Fusion at T2 
 
Table 5 shows that the inclusion in Step 3 of experiential 
avoidance and cognitive fusion, as measured at T1, added in-
cremental explained variance to the prediction of negative 
metacognitive beliefs, F(2, 98) = 7.427, p = .001, and beliefs 
about the need to control thoughts, F(2, 98) = 8.186, p = 
.001. Only negative metacognitive beliefs (β = .42) and expe-
riential avoidance (β = .22) at T1 were significant predictors 
of negative beliefs at T2, with the model explaining 56% of 
the variance. Regarding beliefs about the need to control 
thoughts, only its levels at T1 (β = .31), cognitive fusion (β = 
.32), and negative metacognitive beliefs (β = .19) were shown 
to be significant predictors, with the model explaining 63% 
of the variance. The inclusion of experiential avoidance and 
cognitive fusion did not explain incremental variance in the 
prediction of positive metacognitive beliefs. 
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Table 4. Results from the Regression Analyses Examining the Parallel Multiple Mediator Model of the Effect of Beliefs about Need to Control (X) on Anx-
iety (First Part of the Table) and Stress (Second Part of the Table) (Y) through Experiential Avoidance (M1) and Cognitive Fusion (M2). 
    Bootstrapping BC 95% CI 
 Coefficient SE p Lower Upper 
MODEL M1 (AAQ-II) (T2)   
X (Need to control) (T1) .689 .212 .002   
Anxiety (T1) .448 .235 .060   
Constant 9.171 2.360 < .001   
R2 = .160   
F(2, 103) = 9.778, p < .001   
MODEL M2 (BAFT) (T2)   
X (Need to control) (T1) 1.345 .368 < .001   
Anxiety (T1) 1.688 .408 < .001   
Constant 7.942 4.092 .055   
R2 = .296   
F(2, 103) = 21.628, p < .001   
MODEL Y (Anxiety) (T2)   
X (Need to control) (T1) -.033 .070 .635   
Anxiety (T1) .317 .078 < .001   
M1 (AAQ-II) (T2) .011 .036 .748   
M2 (BAFT) (T2) .077 .021 < .001   
Constant -.574 .780 .463   
R2 = .410   
F(4, 101) = 17.517, p < .001   
INDIRECT EFFECTS   
Overall indirect effect .112 .055  .034 .247 
Indirect effect 1: AAQ-II .008 .025  -.033 .070 
Indirect effect 2: BAFT .104 .052  .028 .222 
MODEL M1 (AAQ-II) (T2)   
X (Need to control) (T1) .617 .213 .005   
Stress (T1) .493 .188 .010   
Constant 8.350 2.334 .001   
R2 = .184   
F(2, 103) = 11.646, p < .001   
MODEL M2 (BAFT) (T2)   
X (Need to control) (T1) 1.386 .387 .001   
Stress (T1) 1.054 .342 .003   
Constant 5.850 4.245 .171   
R2 = .248   
F(2, 103) = 17.003, p < .001   
MODEL Y (Stress) (T2)   
X (Need to control) (T1) -.143 .099 .152   
Stress (T1) .268 .086 .002   
M1 (AAQ-II) (T2) .111 .050 .028   
M2 (BAFT) (T2) .096 .027 .001   
Constant .321 1.078 .767   
R2 = .400   
F(4, 101) = 16.858, p < .001   
INDIRECT EFFECTS   
Overall indirect effect .202 .075  .072 .380 
Indirect effect 1: AAQ-II .068 .047  .006 .198 
Indirect effect 2: BAFT .133 .054  .048 .266 
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Table 5. Hierarchical Regression Analyses of Negative Beliefs, Beliefs about the Need to Control Thoughts, and Positive Beliefs at T2 by Variables at T1. 
 NEGATIVE BELIEFS  NEED TO CONTROL BELIEFS  POSITIVE  BELIEFS 
 β R2  β R2  β R2 










   
STEP 1      
















Positive beliefs -.03  .05  .64*** 
Need to control beliefs .17*  .48***  .06 
      
STEP 2      
Negative beliefs .55***  .30***  .05 
Positive beliefs -.02  .07  .64*** 
Need to control beliefs .15  .46***  .08 
Anxiety -.02  -.10  -.02 
Stress .16  .21*  -.07 
      
STEP 3      
Negative beliefs .42***  .19*  .01 
Positive beliefs -.02   .07   .64***  




 .31***  
.63 
 .08  
.45 
 
Anxiety -.08  -.17  -.02 
Stress .05  .10  -.07 
Experiential avoidance .22*  .13  .15 
Cognitive fusion .24  .32**  -.10 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
As shown in Table 6, only experiential avoidance as 
measured at T1 (β = .78) was a significant predictor of scores 
in experiential avoidance at T2. Experiential avoidance (β = 
.26) and cognitive fusion (β = .35) levels at T1 were the only 
predictors of cognitive fusion at T2. In both cases, dysfunc-
tional metacognitive beliefs did not add incremental ex-
plained variance in Step 3. 
 
Table 6. Hierarchical Regression Analyses of Experiential Avoidance and Cognitive Fusion at T2 by Variables at T1. 
 EXPERIENTIAL AVOIDANCE  COGNITIVE FUSION  
 β R2  β R2  









STEP 1    






 .27*  
Cognitive fusion .06  .43***  
     
STEP 2     
Experiential avoidance .75***  .28*  
Cognitive fusion .15  .38**  
Anxiety -.08  .19  
Stress -.06  -.11  
     
STEP 3       
Experiential avoidance .78***  .26*  
Cognitive fusion .19   .35*   




 .16  
.46 
 
Stress -.03  -.10  
Negative beliefs -.09  -.00  
Positive beliefs .08  .12  
Need to control beliefs -.04  .06  




To our best knowledge, the current study is the first empiri-
cal comparison of key constructs of the MCT and ACT 
models of anxiety disorders. Specifically, this study was de-
signed to examine two hypotheses. Firstly, according to the 
S-REF model, we expected that experiential avoidance and 
cognitive fusion, as similar concepts to the CAS according to 
our previous theoretical analysis, would longitudinally medi-
ate the relationship between dysfunctional metacognitive be-
liefs and anxiety and stress symptoms. Secondly, according 
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to the ACT model, we expected that experiential avoidance 
and cognitive fusion at T1 would predict dysfunctional met-
acognitive beliefs at T2 even when controlling for them and 
for anxiety and stress symptoms at T1. The results generally 
supported both hypotheses.  
In the mediation analyses, a similar pattern of results was 
obtained with negative metacognitive beliefs and beliefs 
about the need to control thoughts. In both cases, cognitive 
fusion as measured at T2 mediated the effect of those meta-
cognitive beliefs at T1 on anxiety symptoms at T2. Both 
cognitive fusion and experiential avoidance acted as media-
tors of the relationships between these negative metacogni-
tive beliefs and stress symptoms. The results of the media-
tion analyses conducted with positive metacognitive beliefs 
were less clear, with cognitive fusion only mediating the rela-
tionship between positive beliefs and stress symptoms, but 
not between positive beliefs and anxiety symptoms (although 
mediation was significant at 90% BC CI). In conclusion, our 
first hypothesis was supported in almost all cases, with cogni-
tive fusion with anxious thoughts and feelings revealed as a 
more consistent mediator of the effect of dysfunctional met-
acognitive beliefs on anxiety and stress symptoms.  
The results supported our second hypothesis only in rela-
tion to negative metacognitive beliefs. Specifically, experien-
tial avoidance at T1 was a significant predictor of negative 
metacognitive beliefs at T2 even when controlling for meta-
cognitions and anxiety and stress symptoms at T1. Likewise, 
cognitive fusion at T1 was shown to be a significant predic-
tor of beliefs about the need to control thoughts. Conversely, 
metacognitive beliefs at T1 did not predict either experiential 
avoidance or cognitive fusion at T2 when controlling for 
their levels at T1. In conclusion, engagement in cognitive fu-
sion and experiential avoidance across time seems to lead to 
the development of negative metacognitive beliefs but not of 
positive beliefs.     
The results of this study can be seen as supportive of 
both the ACT and MCT models of anxiety disorders. On the 
one hand, if we accept that the CAS significantly overlaps 
with the ACT constructs of cognitive fusion and experiential 
avoidance, the results are consistent with the S-REF model 
insofar that the CAS, as measured by the ACT processes, 
mediated the effect of dysfunctional metacognitive beliefs on 
anxiety and stress symptoms. On the other hand, dysfunc-
tional metacognitive beliefs can be seen in the ACT context 
as verbal rules that prompt cognitive fusion with anxious 
thoughts and feelings and the use of experiential avoidance 
strategies (e.g., rumination, worry, thought suppression, etc.) 
to deal with them. For instance, positive metacognitive be-
liefs prompt the use of worry, rumination, and counterpro-
ductive coping behaviors such as suppression, threat moni-
toring, and avoidance to deal with anxiety. Likewise, negative 
metacognitive beliefs prevent the person from interrupting 
worry and rumination, and promote further engagement in 
experiential avoidance because anxiety experiences are 
viewed as dangerous. However, according to our second hy-
pothesis, engaging in cognitive fusion and experiential avoid-
ance predicts the development of negative metacognitive be-
liefs, which then further support the ACT processes. 
Some limitations of the current study are worth mention-
ing. Firstly, as all data were obtained using self-report 
measures, relationships among variables might be artificially 
inflated. Secondly, as the sample was made up of nonclinical 
participants, generalizability of the current findings may be 
limited. Thirdly, only 106 participants completed the study 
out of the 289 who responded to the survey at T1. However, 
no differences in the scores on the psychological constructs 
of interest were found between completers versus noncom-
pleters. Lastly, the longitudinal design used in this study does 
not allow for attributions of causality because no independ-
ent variable was manipulated in this study. Nonetheless, lon-
gitudinal studies such as this one provide a way to explore 
the interrelations of key concepts of psychological models of 
anxiety disorders.  
In conclusion, this is the first study that longitudinally 
compared key constructs of MCT (dysfunctional metacogni-
tive beliefs) and ACT (experiential avoidance and cognitive 
fusion) in the prediction of anxiety and stress symptoms. The 
results were compatible with both models and warrant the 
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